��˾��ֱ��

As the focal point of the Ukrainian crisis shifts from Kyiv to Crimea, ��˾��ֱ�� News turns to Arne Kislenko for insight into what’s going on and what might happen next.

Professor Kislenko is an instructor in the International Relations Program at Trinity College/the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto and associate professor of history at Ryerson University.

Why is Crimea important to Russia, historically and geo-strategically?
Crimea was historically part of Russia until the mid-1950s when it was technically transferred to the then Soviet republic of Ukraine. Russian regimes have for centuries used Crimea as a major sea port – very important in the projection of power against traditional rivals like Turkey – and clearly Putin’s government continues to view it in similar fashion. Moreover, the Crimea population is majority Russian, leading some Russians to believe it is their right/responsibility to “protect” them: despite the fact that the territory is legally Ukrainian.

What are the odds that Russia might seek to expand its control beyond Crimea, into other parts of the pro-Russian, eastern part of Ukraine?
Most experts doubt that Russian forces will invade any other parts of Ukraine, in part because of the tremendous escalation of tensions with the global community and the potential for disastrous results. That does not, however, preclude Putin from supporting Russian nationalists in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere with material and political support.

(Above right: Unidentified gunmen on patrol at Simferopol Airport in Ukraine's Crimea peninsula; photo by Elizabeth Arrott/Voice of America.)

He is already doing that, and it’s likely that in order to destabilize the interim government in Kyiv and press the issue on the need to “protect” Russians in Ukraine, he will continue to do so.

Foreign governments are focusing on using diplomatic and economic pressure to diffuse the crisis. Could things evolve into any kind of military action?
I doubt there will be foreign military intervention. Sanctions and pressures of other sorts, sure, but military action is not likely. There’s an issue of capacity – who goes and in what fashion – as well as the reality of very high losses against a substantial and organized Russian military. But beyond that is the issue of public support at home, or lack thereof, and a definitive lack of political resolve in most quarters after more than a decade of costly wars.

He would otherwise be undermined at home in his attempts to be the protector of Russians and Russian interests. Very few nations in the international community would recognize any secession, and especially not here in the West. It would be a serious problem in international affairs.

(.)